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Abstract
Obstfeld (1994) shows that a currency crisis can be explained by the occurrence of multiple equi-
libria (2 interior equilibria). For the same level of economic fundamentals, it may be optimal for
the government either to devalue or to maintain the peg. The decision depends on the inßationary
expectations of economic agents: it is the phenomenon of self-fulÞlling crisis. In order to avoid this
kind of crisis, this article oﬀers a new proposal: a partial delegation of exchange rate policy to a more
inßation-averse central banker. It shows that if the government continues to decide whether to main-
tain the peg while the central banker chooses the magnitude of any realignment, lower inßationary
expectations will lead to the existence of only one equilibrium. The probability of crisis will then be
considerably reduced and a currency crisis will occur only if negative shocks substantially damage the
level of economic fundamentals.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this article is to determine what conditions allow improvement in the stability of
a Þxed exchange-rate system with an escape clause. It focuses on what are commonly called
second generation of models of currency crises, the most well-known of which is Obstfeld
(1994).1 These models describe the crises in the nineties by stressing the fact that the real
cause of currency crises is not so much what you [policymakers] are actually doing as what the
Þnancial markets suspect you might want to do (Krugman, 1998).
As the cost of defending a Þxed rate increases when private agents expect a devaluation,
a means of strengthening the credibility of the Þxed exchange-rate system is to partially dele-
gate exchange-rate policy to a more inßation-averse central banker. The best strategy for the
government is only to devolve the decision concerning the realignment magnitude. It cannot
delegate the decision whether to maintain the peg as this decision requires taking into account
the cost of realignment (in terms of credibility for instance) that it will incur if a crisis occurs.
In this context, even if the policy maker is rather accommodative, the stability of the Þxed ex-
change rate increases, as economic agents know that this more inßation-averse central banker
will choose a smaller devaluation rate if the government decides to devalue.
Obstfeld (1984), Connolly and Taylor (1984) and Grilli (1986) dealt with this question of the
inßuence of the expected devaluation rate in the context of the Þrst-generation models à la
Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984). In the second-generation models à la Obstfeld
(1994), the interaction between the behaviour of policy makers and economic agents explains the
occurrence of two interior equilibria and then the phenomenon of self-fulÞlling crisis. As a result,
according to private agents expectations, the same initial levels of economic fundamentals may
be consistent both with the maintenance and the abandonment of the Þxed exchange-rate
system. At the lower equilibrium, as inßationary expectations are high, competitiveness and
unemployment problems are so painful that a devaluation occurs unless shocks on output are
quite favourable, while at the higher equilibrium, the crisis occurs only if shocks substantially
1These second-generation models are diﬀerent from the canonical model laid out initially by Krugman
(1979) and reÞned by Flood and Garber (1984). The latter explains crises as a result of a fundamental inconsis-
tency between domestic policies - typically the persistence of money-Þnanced budget deÞcits - and the attempt
to maintain a Þxed exchange rate.
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cut the output level. In this context, the objective of this article is to determine conditions under
which the lower equilibrium can be removed. More particularly, it shows that devolving a part
of exchange-rate policy to a more inßation-averse central banker can ensure the achievement of
a unique equilibrium with a lower probability of realignment.
The Þrst section presents the framework. The second section considers the partial delegation
of exchange rate policy to a more inßation-averse central banker and Þnds conditions required
to make the Þxed exchange-rate system more stable by widening the range of shocks to which
the policy maker maintains the peg. The last section concludes.
2 The framework
The framework is based on the second-generation models à la Obstfeld (1994). The chronol-
ogy of events is the following. First, economic agents expectations are determined. Second, a
shock on output occurs. Then the demand for labour is determined by Þrms. Finally, on the
basis of all this information, the policy maker decides whether to maintain the peg.
In Obstfelds model with an escape clause, policy makers have to choose in each period
between maintaining the peg and proceeding to a realignment. From this decision, two interior
equilibria occur as devaluations are triggered by the governments desire to oﬀset negative
output shocks, but a sudden shift in market sentiment regarding the governments willingness
to tolerate unemployment can trigger a devaluation that could not have occurred under diﬀerent
private expectations (Obstfeld, 1994). So, in one case, the government maintains the peg and
pursues a tightening policy except if negative output shocks occur (the higher equilibrium). In
the other case, as the expected depreciation is high, public authorities will be forced to proceed
to a realignment unless shocks on output are suﬃciently favourable (the lower equilibrium).
The governments loss function is:
LGt =
1
2
£
θGΠt
2 + (yt − y∗)2
¤
+ ΩtC (1)
θG represents the degree of inßation aversion, Πt the current inßation rate, yt the output level
and y∗ the output target, which is assumed above zero (the equilibrium level). C represents the
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realignment cost incurred by the policy maker (in terms of credibility for instance) after the
abandonment of the peg. Consequently, Ωt is a binary variable equal to zero when the policy
maker decides to maintain the peg and equal to one when he decides to devalue.
We assume the partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a central banker who has the
same targets as the policy maker but who places greater weight on the costs of higher inßation.
The central bankers loss function is
LBt =
1
2
£
θBΠt
2 + (yt − y∗)2
¤
(2)
θB represents the central bankers degree of inßation aversion where θB ≥ θG.2
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds. Foreign prices are exogenous and normalised to 1.
Control of exchange-rate variations ∆et and of the inßation rate Πt are therefore equivalent.
The output function is
yt = (Πt − Πat )− ut (3)
Πat represents inßationary expectations and ut is a shock which inßuences the output level.
When ut is positive, it is a negative shock on output. This function means that the achievement
of the output target (y∗ > 0) requires, all things being equal, non-expected inßation. For this
reason, y∗ can also be interpreted as an inßationary bias.
When the peg is maintained (Πt = ∆et = 0), the governments loss is
LGFX =
1
2
(y∗ +Πat + ut)
2 (4)
This loss depends positively on the level of the output target, inßationary expectations and the
size of the adverse output shock.
When the policy maker decides to proceed to a realignment, exchange-rate policy is del-
egated to the central banker. This later chooses a devaluation rate which minimizes its loss
function. So, ∆et is determined such that
∂LBt
∂∆et
= 0, that is,
∆et = Πt =
1
1 + θB
(y∗ +Πat + ut) (5)
2There is no cost of realignment to the central banker because it is the government that decides whether
realignment occurs. If there were full delegation (the central banker also deciding whether to realign), the model
would be the same as Obstfelds, but with the government replaced by the central banker as decision maker.
The results would be qualitatively the same as Obstfelds.
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The more the central banker is inßation averse (θB high), the more the inßuence of output
shocks or inßationary expectations on the devaluation rate is reduced.
Substituting (5) in (1) and taking into account the output function (3) , the governments
loss when it decides to proceed to a realignment is
LGFL =
θG +
¡
θB
¢2
2
¡
1 + θB
¢2 (y∗ +Πat + ut)2+C (6)
Comparison of the losses according to the decision of maintaining the peg or not allows the
determination of conditions (evaluated in terms of shocks) under which the policy maker will
decide to proceed to a realignment. The condition for realignment is LGFX − LGFL > 0, that is,
1 + 2θB − θG¡
1 + θB
¢2 (y∗ +Πat + ut)2 > 2C (7)
This realignment condition depends on the degrees of inßation aversion of the government
and the central banker, the inßationary bias, inßationary expectations, the cost of realignment
and the shock which occurs on output. Given that the degree of inßation aversion of the central
banker is greater than or equal to that of the government, this inequality indicates that the
probability of realignment increases when the inßationary bias and expected inßation are higher
and when a shock negatively inßuences the output level.
The two solutions of this equation correspond to the thresholds ui from which the policy
maker will decide to devalue,
ui = ± 1
1 + θB
s
2C
1 + 2θB − θG − y
∗ − Πat i = 1, 2 (8)
These thresholds are determined in two steps as they depend on inßationary expectations, which
in turn depend on these expected thresholds. The only source of uncertainty is the real shock
so that, at the equilibrium, expected thresholds are equal to ui. This equilibrium threshold
is deÞned by Obstfeld (1994) as the highest value of the shock at which the government still
Þnds it optimal to defend the exchange parity.
Private agents expectations are formed on the basis of the authorities decision rule, taking
into account the existence of an escape clause and the fact that exchange-rate policy is partially
devolved to a more inßation-averse central banker. These expectations will then inßuence the
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decision of the government to maintain the Þxed rate or to proceed to a realignment. As a
result,
Πat = δ(ui) = Pr(ut ≤ ui)× 0 + Pr(ut > ui)×Et−1(Πt/ut > ui) (9)
where Pr(ut ≤ ui) is the probability that ut is below or equal to the equilibrium threshold ui,
Pr(ut > ui) is the probability that ut is above the equilibrium threshold ui and Et−1(Πt/ut > ui)
is a rational expectation of the inßation rate when the government devalues (in which case ut
is above ui).
Following the example of Obstfeld (1994), shocks are assumed uniformly distributed on the
interval (−µ, µ). Then,
Pr(ut > ui) =
µ− ui
2µ
and Et−1(ut/ut > ui) =
µ+ ui
2
(10)
High values of the threshold ui (close to µ) mean the probability of crisis is very low while lower
values (close to −µ) mean the probability of realignment is high.
Under these assumptions, inßationary expectations are:
Πat = δ(ui) =
µ− ui¡
1 + θB
¢
2µ− µ+ ui
µ
y∗ +
µ+ ui
2
¶
(11)
Two factors are critical for the determination of these expectations. First, when the central
banker is very inßation averse, inßationary expectations are close to zero. As a result, the
stability of the exchange-rate regime is improved. Second, when the threshold is close to −µ,
inßationary expectations are very high because such a threshold means that a crisis occurs
unless shocks on employment are very favourable. Conversely, when u is close to µ, inßation-
ary expectations are close to zero. The crisis occurs only if shocks negatively inßuence the
employment level.
As policy makers take into account these expectations, equation (11) is integrated in the
equation (7) . The realignment condition becomes
1 + 2θB − θG¡
1 + θB
¢2
"
4µ
¡
1 + θB
¢
(y∗ + u) + µ (µ− 2u)
2
£
2µ
¡
1 + θB
¢− µ+ u¤
#2
> 2C (12)
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Therefore, equilibrium thresholds from which policy makers decide to devalue are equal to
ui = −
¡
1 + 2θB
¢
µ+
s
2C
¡
1 + θB
¢2
1 + 2θB − θG ±
vuut2C ³1 + 2θB − ¡θB¢2´
1 + 2θB − θG − 4µ
¡
1 + θB
¢ ¡
y∗ − θBµ¢
(13)
We have two interior equilibrium thresholds: u1 is the lower equilibrium threshold and u2 the
higher equilibrium threshold. As the sign in front of the square root diﬀers according to which
equilibrium threshold occurs, the impact of variables and parameters on the two equilibrium
thresholds can be diﬀerent.3
In order to improve the stability of the exchange-rate system, a Þrst step is to determine
conditions under which the lower equilibrium threshold can be removed4. Under these condi-
tions, the probability of self-fulÞlling crisis will decrease. It will be then important to analyse
the properties of the higher equilibrium threshold (the only equilibrium remaining).
3 Analysis of the stability of the exchange-rate system
3.1 Conditions for the removal of the lower equilibrium threshold
Let ρ = 1√
2θB
µ
µ
¡
θB + 1
¢±rµ³µ ¡θB¢2 + 2 (2µ− y∗) θB + µ− 2y∗´¶ . Conditions for the
removal of the lower equilibrium threshold are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The weight placed by the policy maker on inßation costs θG has to be greater
than or equal to −C+ρ
2+2ρ2θB
ρ2
in order to remove the lower equilibrium and reduce the
probability of self-fulÞlling crisis.
As the output shock is assumed to be distributed in (−µ, µ) , the condition to remove the
lower equilibrium is
u1 ≤ −µ (14)
3The case studied by Obtsfeld is just a particular case of this model where the degree of inßation aversion
of the central banker is the same as that of the government, that is θG = θB.
4As the realignment condition and thus equilibrium thresholds depend on the parameter µ, changing the
interval in which shocks are distributed is not suﬃcient to eliminate the lower equilibrium.
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From this condition, the value of θG from which the lower equilibrium will be removed is
θG =
−C + ρ2 + 2ρ2θB
ρ2
(15)
where ρ = 1√
2θB
µ
µ
¡
θB + 1
¢±rµ³µ ¡θB¢2 + 2 (2µ− y∗) θB + µ− 2y∗´¶.
Using Obstfelds parameter values, that is C = 0.00045, y∗ = 0.01, µ = 0.03 and θG = 0.15
(policy maker rather accommodative), the condition to remove the lower equilibrium is that
θB ≥ 0.20083
Hence, when θG = 0.15, the degree of inßation aversion of the central banker has to be greater
than or equal to 0.20083 to obtain only one equilibrium threshold u2.5
So, to make a Þxed exchange-rate system more stable when a government is rather accom-
modative, the solution is to convince economic agents that in case of realignment the policy
followed will not be too accommodative and that, even if output changes will be corrected, the
weight placed on inßation will remain relatively high
¡
θB > θG
¢
.
3.2 The properties of the unique equilibrium threshold
Under the conditions deÞned previously, the range of shocks under which the policy maker
maintains the peg has been widened and only the higher equilibrium threshold remains. How-
ever, what are the properties of this unique equilibrium? Do additional instruments exist which
allow reduction of the probability of crisis?
The characteristics of the higher equilibrium threshold can be summarized by the proposition
below.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions deÞned in Proposition 1 and using Obstfelds parameter
values,
5There is only one solution as there is no solution for
ρ =
1√
2θB
Ã
µ
³
θB + 1
´
+
s
µ
µ
µ
³
θB
´2
+ 2 (2µ− y∗) θB + µ− 2y∗
¶!
8
i) the higher equilibrium threshold obtained is greater than the higher equilibrium thresh-
old evaluated by Obstfeld (1994);
ii) the associated expected depreciation rate and the probability of crisis are lower.
Taking the values of θG and θB from which the lower equilibrium threshold is removed
(θG = 0.15, θB = 0.20083), the value of the higher equilibrium threshold is
u2 = 1. 0301× 10−2 (16)
At this threshold, the expected depreciation rate is Πat = 1. 1345 % per period and the probabil-
ity of devaluation Pr (u > u2) is 32.83%. u2 is above the higher equilibrium threshold evaluated
by Obstfeld (1994), which is 0.00098 with an expected depreciation rate of 1.23% per period.
These results are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 where equilibrium thresholds are determined
by the intersection between the curve and the horizontal line.
Figure 1
Figure 2
This leads to the conclusion that partial delegation to a more inßation-averse central banker
allows, via inßationary expectations, the removal of the lower equilibrium threshold, but also
reduces the probability of crisis at the higher equilibrium. As illustrated in Figure 3, the more
inßation-averse the central banker is, the lower is the probability of crisis.
Figure 3
The two last propositions focus on the inßuence of the governments degree of inßation
aversion, the inßationary bias and the realignment cost on the higher equilibrium threshold.
Proposition 3. A decrease in the policy makers degree of inßation aversion θG and an increase
in the inßationary bias y∗, by reducing the higher equilibrium threshold, strengthen the
need to devolve exchange-rate policy to a central banker.
The relationship between θG and u2 is represented in Figure 4.
Figure 4
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Proposition 4. With only one equilibrium threshold, an increase in the realignment cost C
causes a reduction of the probability of crisis.
This corresponds to a shift upward of the horizontal line in Figure 2. Note that this eﬀect was
ambiguous when two interior equilibria existed (Figure 1), as the lower equilibrium threshold
became lower and the higher equilibrium threshold increased (Flood and Marion, 1997).
Using (13) with a positive sign in front of the square root, Propositions 3 and 4 are conÞrmed
by the following derivatives,
∂u2
∂θG
> 0 (17)
∂u2
∂y∗
< 0 (18)
∂u2
∂C
> 0 (19)
The last derivative leads to the conclusion that a strengthening of the commitment to maintain
the peg (like the implementation of the EMS or like the Maastricht criterion on the exchange
rate6), by making exit from the system more costly, allows a reduction in the probability of
crisis at the higher equilibrium and an improvement in the stability of the Þxed exchange-rate
system.
4 Conclusion
This article shows that, in a Þxed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, a partial del-
egation of exchange-rate policy to a more inßation-averse central banker can be an eﬃcient
strategy to avoid self-fulÞlling crises. This new proposal of partial delegation comes from the
idea that there is a cost to the government (in terms of credibility for example) when a realign-
ment occurs. To take this cost into account, the decision as to whether to maintain the peg is
left to the government, but the magnitude of any realignment can be delegated to the central
banker. Whereas previous second-generation models are characterized by the existence of
multiple equilibria, the introduction of partial delegation can lead to the existence of a unique
equilibrium threshold (the higher equilibrium threshold). At this equilibrium, a crisis occurs
6This forbade EMS countries to realign during the two years prior to the formation of the Union
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only if negative shocks substantially reduce the output level. The Þxed exchange rate is then
easier to maintain as economic agents do not believe it will be abandoned as long as economic
fundamentals are consistent with the maintenance of the peg.
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Fig. 1. Obstfelds case (2 interior equilibria) 
Fig. 2. With delegation to a central banker 
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Fig. 4. Impact of θG on the higher equilibrium 
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